APPROACHING THE END OF POST-SOVIE T
TRANSITION? TRENDS OF YOUTH CRIME IN
KLAIPĖDA IN 2005-2019

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Abstract

The article presents a sociological and criminological analysis of data on registered youth
criminal offences (young people of 14-29 years old) in Klaipėda. The analysed period
covers the years from 2005 to 2019 (late post-Soviet period). It includes youth crime
offences and persons suspected of committing a crime. The period is characterised by a
constant downward trend in crime. There were no substantial changes in criminal law
during this period, however, Lithuania significantly strengthened the legal and material
background for work with juveniles and young adults. On the basis of the insights of the
theories of anomie, social control and ecological criminology, the article analyses the
key indicators of youth crime and its dynamics. The changes by age and employment of
persons who have allegedly committed criminal offences are analysed.

Keywords: youth, criminal offences, persons who have allegedly committed criminal
offences, anomie, social control, ecological theory of criminology (Chicago School).

Introduction

One of the traditional sociological hypotheses is that radical social change is often
accompanied by anomie (Durkheim, 1897; Cullen & Agnew, 2003). In many studies, anomie
is understood as an independent variable that predicts most manifestations of deviant behaviour
such as suicide, unemployment, mental disorders, and crime (Bjarnason et al. 2005; Clinard,
1964; Durkheim, 1897; Merton, 1938; Thorlindsson & Bernburg, 2004; Zhao & Cao, 2010).
This interpretive scheme was born in Western Europe in the 19th century. However, it appears
to be very convincing when explaining the political and social changes that took place after
the collapse of the Soviet Union (Outhwaite & Ray 2005; Kim & Pridemore 2005; Kupatadze
2012; Sanghera et al. 2007). High crime rates in post-Soviet countries have always been a
great indicator for sociologists to indicate the transition, and empirical crime curves have
made it easy to trace the beginning of this transformation. The beginning of the social process
has always been of interest to social scientists since it is something new and exciting for the
analytical imagination. However, when can the end of an anomie or transition be announced? When can we talk about stabilization of social order and what empirical indicators illustrate this? Should the structure and volume of crime also stabilize in the newly established social order?

Statistically, crime as an empirical indicator is very beneficial for sociological analysis. Systematically collected official crime statistics makes it possible to identify general trends and shifts in the development of crime. However, in order to understand it, it is necessary to link data to wider social processes and the demographic structure of society. Crime trends are not only an indicator of political or social change or an expression of the stability of values. They also show the demographic dynamics of a particular society, where young people play an important role. This is probably why most sociologists are not only interested in crime in a general sense, they focus on the crimes committed by young people. The young generation is the future of any community. However, youth is also one of the most problematic periods of life. In trying to understand community values, adopting its living standards, finding the way in the society, the young person faces many contradictions and disruptions. Delinquent and later criminal behaviour is the manifestation of these problems. To alleviate these problems, societies invest in minors and young people, their personality development in the family, their education, moral and legal education, and social security.

Based on the above assumptions, the article focuses on crimes committed by young people as a sensitive empirical indicator that allows hypotheses to be made about much broader social processes than crime per se. The choice of Klaipėda as an example of a post-Soviet city, as well as the period between 2005 and 2019 allows us to raise the question: what social processes shape juvenile delinquency in the post-Soviet city? How is it changing? What governs the fluctuations in youth crime in the long run?

Before moving on to empirical analysis, we want to explain some theoretical and methodological assumptions. The article analyses the dynamics of youth crime (aged 14-29). This dynamics demonstrates the trend of crime reduction in post-Soviet Klaipėda. The city of Klaipėda has been chosen as an empirical illustration. It not only allows a focused disclosure of a social phenomenon, but also supports the identification of possible broad explanations as well as directions for causal interpretation. In our analysis, we relied on two hypotheses that explain causation. The first would argue that the increase or decrease in crime is determined by the effectiveness of the legal system. The second hypothesis is a demographic one: as the number of individuals in a particular age group decreases, so does the number of crimes committed by that group.

The chosen period in the scientific research of the youth of the post-Soviet society is relevant in several aspects. First of all, it is the time of great social transformations that are still taking place. One ideological and economic system, which has structured many areas of daily life and contributed the social practices (including youth crime) with specific forms, is gradually being replaced by another. Changes in political power occur fairly quickly, while social life is more inert. This means that the models of the two systems with values, behaviour, and perception of the environment have coexisted for a long time. Such coexistence of the two systems can be described as a “post-Soviet society” that attempted to break free from the Soviet legacy and move towards a free market economy. Such a transition from one system to another often causes various fields of social tension (Grigas, 1998). In our opinion, youth crime in Klaipėda can be speculatively explained by the expression of social fields of tension.
It should be pointed out that the collapse of the Soviet Union was accompanied by an unprecedented increase in crime (including juveniles and youth) in Lithuania and other areas of the Soviet Union (Pridemore, 2000; Juška et al., 2004; Shcherbakova, 2005; Gilinskiy, 2006; Babachinaite, 2012; Dobryninas & Sakalauskas, 2011). This increase was only stopped after 2000. The helplessness of law enforcement agencies also weakened the day-to-day impact of social norms. Under conditions of social anomie, some youth groups were much more likely to succumb to the temptation to break the law, as such action in certain social groups was no longer considered a violation of the universal social norm or law.

The younger generation that lives in a modern risk society and whose permanent state of social life is less and less predictable, loses the determinants and coherence of collectivism, but, on the other hand, is much more flexible (Brucner & Mayer, 2005). The experience of the younger generation is often complicated by the myth that exists in societies about the moral decline of young people. It is illustrated by the ever-increasing youth crime. This myth is often only speculative, yet it effectively mobilizes adult concern for young people, and justifies the demands for stricter and more effective social control (Pearson, 1983). In this context, changes in public and state institutions reveal efforts to regulate the process that enables the modelling of positive youth socialization (problem-solving) strategies.

**The aim of the research**: based on sociological and criminological analysis, to reveal the changes of registered youth crime in Klaipėda in 2005-2019.

**Object of the research**: changes of registered youth crime in Klaipėda 2005-2019.

**The methods of the research**: analysis of scientific literature, legal documents and statistics. This allowed the formation of two hypotheses explaining youth crime: the first one – the dynamics of crime is determined by the efficiency of the legal system; the second one – the dynamics of crime is determined by demographic changes in the youth population.

**Social and demographic changes in post-Soviet Klaipėda**

Over the last three decades, Klaipėda has undergone a number of social and demographic changes that have structured the general context of crime (especially youth crime). Thus, it is important to consider the features of the changes that have taken place. First, over the last three decades, the population of Klaipėda has decreased by more than a fifth. The population of Klaipėda in 2019 was 166.6 thousand, while in 1991 it was 207 thousand. In 2019 the population of young people (aged 14-29) in Klaipėda was 17.8 thousand while in 2005 there were 43.9 thousand people of this age living in Klaipėda. This means that in the period of 15 years the number of young people in the city has fallen by 60%.

In the period between 1991-1994 after Lithuania regained its independence not only the units of the Soviet army, but also the workers of former industrial enterprises who worked in the port left the city. The population of Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians has fallen sharply. According to the 2011 census, the population of these nationalities in the port city was twice smaller than in 1990. Besides, the city underwent intensive migration processes. The official statistics states that during the period of 1990-2010 the number of people who left Klaipėda reached 90 thousand, while the number of people who arrived to Klaipėda was 64.3 thousand. This means that in the period of 15 years the number of young people in the city has fallen by 60%.
who left Klaipėda during the history of the city was registered in 2010. That year, 7.7 thousand people left the city. Settlement flows have failed to compensate for population decline.

As observed in the feasibility study on youth (Klaipėda Youth Situation Survey 2015), population of the age group 15-19 in Klaipėda in the period 2011-2015 decreased by 26%, the decrease in the age group 20-24 was 14%, and the fall in the age group 25-29 was a bit over 2%. Such statistical dynamics of the young population and a sharp decline in the population aged 5-15 made it possible to predict that in a five-year period the relative share of young people in Klaipėda was going to experience a great decrease. This forecast was confirmed and the number of young people in Klaipėda decreased steadily until 2019. Klaipėda failed to establish its status as a regional center, able to compete with the other two regional centers – Vilnius and Kaunas, as well as alternatives of external emigration. Considering the fact that the zone of influence of Klaipėda city is half the size of mainland regional centers, this goal (to become an attractive regional center for young people) has become a serious challenge for Klaipėda city.

**General features of crime in post-Soviet Klaipėda**

Crime is an inevitable attribute of the social life of every society. In general, the most favourable conditions for crime are in locations with a greater concentration of the population, greater differences in material well-being, and greater numbers of people who value life differently. These conditions are obviously met by cities and metropolitan areas. A city is a complex system as regards social, demographic, national, cultural and other aspects. There are sources of tension, insecurity and conflict there. The Chicago school classic Louis Wirth (1938) presented a concept of the city that was critical of the urban lifestyle. In his view, the city is spreading an atomized, anonymous and individualistic way of life where community ties and collectivism disappear. Cities are densely populated areas inhabited by people with very different values, goals and ambitions.

Taking into account the number of crimes registered in the city and the intensity of crime, Klaipėda has long been ahead of other Lithuanian cities (Acus et al., 2018). In Klaipėda, youth crime, which is an integral part of overall crime, often exceeded the overall crime rates in the country (Acus & Kraniauskas, 2019).

Statistics of criminal offences in Klaipėda shows that the development of crime in the port-city can be divided into two distinct periods. The first period covers the years 1988-2000, characterised by a particularly rapid increase in recorded crime (from 1309 cases in 1988 to 6439 cases in 2000, i.e. the increase of 4.9 times). This period can reasonably be labelled as a period of anomie caused by social changes. The second period covers the years 2000-2019. The period coincides with the development of a consumer society and the characteristic feature of this period is a slow (but consistent) decline in registered crimes (from 6,439 cases in 2000 to 3,338 cases in 2018). Although the crime rate has dropped significantly, it still was statistically high enough. This fact can be explained by the theoretical insights of Bauman (2011) and Castells (2007), who state that the regulation of the needs of the consumer society reduces the dynamics of crime in the society. Lower needs and greater socio-economic opportunities in becoming an active member of a consumer society reduce the illegal expression of consumerism (crime).
Socio-demographic characteristics of youth alleged of committing criminal offences in Klaipėda

Table 1. Suspects of committing a criminal offence by age groups, Klaipėda, 2005-2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Natural persons (all age groups)</th>
<th>Young adults (18-29 years old)</th>
<th>Minors (14-17 years old)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>1772</td>
<td>868</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1541</td>
<td>689</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1402</td>
<td>687</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1518</td>
<td>674</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1530</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1540</td>
<td>689</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>1536</td>
<td>668</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1628</td>
<td>644</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>1778</td>
<td>639</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>1777</td>
<td>653</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>1508</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>1187</td>
<td>493</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>1375</td>
<td>541</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>981</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>1091</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data of the Information Technology and Communications Department under the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Lithuania.

The data show that in the period of 2005-2019 the number of persons aged 18-29 and alleged of having committed crimes decreased. Fifteen years ago, this age group accounted for almost half (48.9%) of all persons alleged of committing crimes. In 2019, this age group accounted for just over a third of those suspected of committing crimes.

An interesting fact is that during this period the number of young people (aged 14-29) in the city fell by about 60% and the drop in crime rate in this age group was also similar.
Compared to the year 2005, the number of crimes committed by young people in 2019 fell by 65 percent. This fact seems to confirm our initial hypothesis that the decline in youth crime is due to the demographic contraction of this group. However, as we will see later, the rates of juvenile delinquency are very different from those of young adults.

The number of young adults (aged 18-29) suspected of committing crimes decreased by 2.6 times (from 868 to 333 persons). Given that the socio-economic situation of this age group is usually very difficult (especially during economic crises), such a significant decrease in the number of people suspected of committing crimes is surprising. It is likely that the Law on the Framework of Youth Policy, adopted in 2003, significantly increased the attention of the state towards youth problems. There are currently 39 open youth centres and 102 open youth spaces in Lithuania. In 2018, a new Law on the Framework of Youth Policy was adopted. Its purpose is to facilitate the communication with young people living in exclusion and on a street. The significant reduction in the numbers of criminals may also be accounted by the large emigration of young people of this age group, both to the capital and abroad.

In Klaipėda, the number of juveniles (aged 14-17), who were suspected of committing criminal offences decreased more than four times (4.36 times) – from 266 to 61 persons. The total number of criminals in the city also decreased from 1,772 to 1,091. However, the decline is less impressive. The tendency can be accounted by the fact that there are about 40 governmental institutions and non-governmental organizations in Lithuania that work in the field of juvenile delinquency prevention and are responsible for the improvement of their living conditions. It is likely that the long-term attention of the state in solving the problems of minors has yielded positive results (Acus & Kraniauskas, 2019). The available statistical data show that youth crime in the city is neither growing nor getting younger. This contradicts the forecasts provided by sociologists and criminologists both in Lithuania and other countries.

The comparison of trends in juvenile delinquency (age 14-17) and crime committed by young adults (age 18-29), demonstrates a clear difference between the two. Over fifteen years, juvenile delinquency has decreased by 78 percent and the number of crimes committed
by young adults has fallen by 62 percent. The differences in rates of decline mean that crime control and prevention differ markedly between the two demographic groups.

Thus, attention has to be paid to the fact that during this period the juvenile delinquency in Klaipėda has decreased by 48 percent, and the numbers of crimes committed by young adults – by 64 percent. This means that the dynamics of crime among young adults can be explained by demographic processes, as the rates of decline are more or less the same for both group size and crime. However, juvenile delinquency rate and the decline in the numbers of individuals in this group are very different – the crime curve is falling much faster than the overall decline in the size of this age group. It is obvious that this fact cannot be explained by demographic factors alone, as in the case of young adults. Also, these differences can probably be explained by the fact that since 1998 various programmes for the prevention of juvenile delinquency have been implemented in Lithuania on the state level (Acus & Kraniauskas, 2019). The programmes approached juveniles as an object of exceptional social control and concern. These programmes have had an obvious result. Young adults lose this exclusive status and are identified with the rest of the adult community.

Another socio-demographic characteristic of persons suspected of committing criminal offences is employment. Employment is of great importance for reporting the general development of crime in Klaipėda.

**Table 2.** Employment of persons suspected of committing a criminal offence, Klaipėda, 2005-2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Unemployed people registered with the Labor Exchange</th>
<th>Unemployed people</th>
<th>People with disabilities</th>
<th>Housewives</th>
<th>Retired people</th>
<th>Not going to any educational institution</th>
<th>Prisoners</th>
<th>People on military service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>793</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>684</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>609</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>687</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>755</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>657</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>617</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>617</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>626</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>542</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>571</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Data of the Information Technology and Communications Department under the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Lithuania.
As seen from the table above, the biggest number of people suspected of committing crimes are either unemployed or do not go to any educational institution. During the Soviet era, the share of those who were unemployed or did not go to any educational institution among persons alleged of criminal offences varied from 7% up to 13%. After the restoration of independence in Lithuania until the year 2000, these numbers rose to 67 percent (Babachinaitė, 2012). Later in Klaipėda, these numbers started to decrease slowly and in 2019 accounted for 31.8%. In 2015, the youth unemployment rate reached in the largest cities of Lithuania was: 6.2 % in Panevėžys, 4.5 % in Vilnius, 4.5 % in Šiauliai, 4.5 % in Kaunas, 5.3 % in Klaipėda. 1496 young unemployed people were registered at the Klaipėda Labour Exchange in 2015. Over the next five years, youth unemployment fluctuated slightly. During the period of 2015-2018, there was a small decline in unemployment. However, in 2019, the youth unemployment rate increased to 6.3% and exceeded the rate in 2015. The breaking-off of public relations with the community (refusal to study and to work) supports the basic assumption of late control theory that criminal offences occur when an individual weakens or breaks-off public relations (Hirschi, 1969).

In general, the change in the numbers of these persons correlates with the economic and social conditions of life in the country. Economic growth over the past decades has not led to a proportionate increase in youth employment. This has resulted in a painful effect on the solution of youth problems. Due to the negative impact of the post-crisis economic situation on the labour market, the assessment of the dynamics of the factors determining youth unemployment has become problematic, since with the increase of GDP youth unemployment has not decreased. Negative factors could include a decrease in the youth workforce, an increase in the numbers of inactive young people, and the influence of the informal labour market. These reasons distort youth unemployment rates. It can be stated that the measures applied in Lithuania to reduce youth unemployment do not substantially change the employment situation of young people in the labour market. It can be argued that the impact of these measures is too weak to compensate for the changes in the labour market due to macroeconomic developments.

Table 3. Educational institutions of persons suspected of committed a criminal offence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>General secondary education school</th>
<th>Vocational training school</th>
<th>College</th>
<th>University</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Individuals who are suspected of having committed criminal offences do not always break off the relations with the community. Crimes are also committed by young people who go to school or study. As seen from the table above, the largest number of young persons alleged of having committed criminal offences during this period attended general secondary education schools. The share of young persons who went to general secondary education institutions in the total number of suspects varied from 64.6% in 2005 to 48.5% in 2019.

Other educational institutions cannot compare to a general secondary education school as regards the numbers of young persons suspected of committing a criminal offence. The number of vocational school students who have broken the law is much lower. The truth is that it is slowly rising within the overall structure of youth crime. For example, in 2005 the number of students of vocational institutions who were suspected of committing criminal offences was 21.3%, while in 2019 the numbers reached 38.5%. However, in absolute numbers, the number of persons suspected of committing criminal offences has decreased from 76 to 27 persons. In this respect the surprising fact is that there is a high rate of university students who commit one or another criminal offence. For example, in 2012 university students accounted for 14% of suspects who have committed criminal offences. However, this percentage has been steadily declining in the following years.

Conclusions

The overview of the statistical data makes it possible to identify several important trends in youth crime. First, in the period between 2005 and 2019 crime among young people was falling sharply. This is illustrated by both the absolute numbers and the change in the age of those suspected of committing crimes. In 2005, minors and young adults accounted for 63.9% of all persons suspected of committing a crime, while in 2019 this age group shrank to 36.1%. Second, the rate of decline in juvenile delinquency (14-17 years) is faster than the rate of decline in this demographic group. Crime control and prevention measures directed towards juvenile offenders have approached this group with special attention and this resulted in the decrease of juvenile delinquency. Third, decline in crime among young adults (18-29 years of age) correlates with the demographic shrinking tendencies of this group. As the proportion of the population in this age group decreases, so does the number of crimes committed by this group.

At the beginning of the article, we have formulated a general question: does the decline in youth crime mean that we are undergoing the end of radical social transformations in post-Soviet society?

The long-term declining trend in crime and the observed fluctuations indicate that the social processes structuring crime are still ongoing. Absolute figures suggest that the downward trend will continue for several years to come. The drastic reduction in juvenile delinquency is not the result of societal self-regulation but the result of strong state intervention. This

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Arrests</th>
<th>Convictions</th>
<th>Fines</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data of the Information Technology and Communications Department under the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Lithuania.
means that intensive state control allows us to talk only about the temporary and coercive maintenance of social order in the target group. It can be said that the hypotheses raised at the beginning of the article have been partially confirmed (the increase or decrease in crime rate is determined by the efficiency of the legal system; as the number of individuals in a particular age group decreases, so does the number of crimes committed by this group).

However, the state gradually loses its power over individuals who grow up from the age of minors and become adults.

On the other hand, if we decide that the indicator of the stabilization of the social order is not the decrease in the number of crimes, but the relative share of offenders in a particular age group, then we can talk about some sort of stabilization in the crime rate. Over the last 15 years, a similar proportion of young people have committed offences. The proportion of offenders in the age group of 14-29 is more or less stable – about 2.2 %. Does this stabilization mean that the post-Soviet transition is over? Probably yes. At least for post-Soviet youth.

Saying that the negative effect of post-Soviet social transformations on youth behaviour is coming to an end, we have to note another sociological fact – the ageing of crime. An increasing proportion of offenders are over the age of 30. Their proportion has almost doubled in the last 15 years. These facts allow us to make a new hypothesis about different rates of transition in different age groups or generations, that social self-regulatory stability in the same society can be differentiated. Young people have overcome the challenges of post-Soviet transition, while the older generation is still overwhelmed with them. We believe that this speculative hypothesis, which comes up from the analysis of statistical data, would certainly enrich the theory of anomie and its studies. The authors of the article provoke further research on crime and hope that the sociological insights on youth crime outlined in the article can serve as comparative research in other cities and other post-communist countries.

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APPROACHING THE END OF POST-SOVIET TRANSITION?
TRENDS OF YOUTH CRIME IN KLAIPĖDA IN 2005-2019

Summary

Liutauras Kraniauskas, Arūnas Acus, Klaipėda University, Lithuania

The article analyses the dynamics of youth crime (aged 14-29). This dynamics demonstrates the trend of crime reduction in post-Soviet Klaipėda. The city of Klaipėda has been chosen as an empirical illustration. It not only allows a focused disclosure of a social phenomenon, but also supports the identification of possible broad explanations as well as directions for causal interpretation.

The chosen period in the scientific research of the youth of the post-Soviet society is relevant in several aspects. First of all, it is the time of great social transformations that are still taking place. One ideological and economic system, which has structured many areas of daily life and contributed the social practices (including youth crime) with specific forms, is gradually being replaced by another. Changes in political power occur fairly quickly, while social life is more inert. This means that the models of the two systems with values, behaviour, and perception of the environment have coexisted for a long time. Such coexistence of the two systems can be described as a “post-Soviet society” that attempted to break free from the Soviet legacy and move towards a free market economy.

The aim of the research: based on sociological and criminological analysis, to reveal the changes of registered youth crime in Klaipėda in 2005-2019.


The methods of the research: analysis of scientific literature, legal documents and statistics. This allowed the formation of two hypotheses explaining youth crime: the first one – the dynamics of crime is determined by the efficiency of the legal system; the second one – the dynamics of crime is determined by demographic changes in the youth population.

The overview of the statistical data makes it possible to identify several important trends in youth crime. First, in the period between 2005 and 2019 crime among young people was falling sharply. This is illustrated by both the absolute numbers and the change in the age of those suspected of committing crimes. In 2005, minors and young adults accounted for 63.9% of all persons suspected of committing a crime, while in 2019 this age group shrank to 36.1%. Second, the rate of decline in juvenile delinquency (14-17 years) is faster than the rate of decline in this demographic group. Crime control and prevention
measures directed towards juvenile offenders have approached this group with special attention and this resulted in the decrease of juvenile delinquency. Third, decline in crime among young adults (18-29 years of age) correlates with the demographic shrinking tendencies of this group. As the proportion of the population in this age group decreases, so does the number of crimes committed by this group.

The drastic reduction in juvenile delinquency is not the result of societal self-regulation but the result of strong state intervention. This means that intensive state control allows us to talk only about the temporary and coercive maintenance of social order in the target group. It can be said that the hypotheses raised at the beginning of the article have been partially confirmed (the increase or decrease in crime rate is determined by the efficiency of the legal system; as the number of individuals in a particular age group decreases, so does the number of crimes committed by this group).

Saying that the negative effect of post-Soviet social transformations on youth behaviour is coming to an end, we have to note another sociological fact – the ageing of crime. An increasing proportion of offenders are over the age of 30. Young people have overcome the challenges of post-Soviet transition, while the older generation is still overwhelmed with them. We believe that this speculative hypothesis, which comes up from the analysis of statistical data, would certainly enrich the theory of anomie and its studies. The authors of the article provoke further research on crime and hope that the sociological insights on youth crime outlined in the article can serve as comparative research in other cities and other post-communist countries.

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